Just after the turn of the last century, the position of the president of a major railroad was not the safest occupation around. On November 29, 1906, Thanksgiving day, Samuel Spencer, the president of the Southern Railroad was killed when his private car was rammed by a faster passenger train which was following the local his car was on. Just over five years later, history repeated itself.

In the early hours of Monday, January 22, 1912, at the water tank near the southern Illinois junction town of Kinmundy, train No. 25, The New Orleans Express, the coach section of the Panama Limited, following special orders, stopped for water. At approximately 12:31 a.m., just a minute or two after stopping, and before the flagman could get very far back, No. 25 was rammed by No. 3, the Panama Limited. The two trains were combined south of Memphis. On the rear of No. 25 was a wooden Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific office car. That car was telescoped 2/3 thirds of its length by the engine of No. 3, the 1079. Four of the occupants of the private car, all prominent railroad men were instantly killed, and four other occupants suffered minor injuries. Several trainmen were also injured suffered minor injuries. Several trainmen were also injured.

Killed at the scene were Frank Otis Melcher, second vice president of the Rock Island, a resident of Winnetka, II; Judge Edward B. Pierce, general solicitor of the Rock Island, also a resident of Winnetka, II; Major Eldridge E. Wright, vice president of the Memphis Bridge Company and an attorney representing Rock Island interests in the Memphis area where he resided; and James T. Harahan, the retired president of the Illinois Central Railroad, the current president of the Memphis Bridge Company, a resident of Chicago. They were on the way to a meeting in Memphis to discuss the building of a railroad bridge over the Mississippi River.

Harahan, a native of Lowell, Mass was born in 1841. He started his railroad career with the United States military railroad system during the Civil War. In 1866 he started working for the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. He advanced through the ranks and in 1881 became the superintendent of the L & N Memphis Division. That year he was transferred to New Orleans to become superintendent of the newly acquired Mobile-New Orleans division. He advanced to the position of general manager of the L & N. He later was the general manager of the Chesapeake and Ohio at Baltimore. In 1890 he joined the Illinois Central as second vice president and general manager of the Louisville, New Orleans and Texas {later to become the Yazoo and Mississippi Valley Railroad).

During most of his IC career, Harahan worked under president Stuyvesant Fish. Harahan oversaw many improvements to the railroad, including the massive dock complex on the Mississippi River in New Orleans known as Stuyvesant Docks {Sty Docks}. He also developed the big yard just outside New Orleans, in what is now the community of Harahan. As the influence of Edward H. Harriman increased within the railroad, Harahan allied himself with the Harriman group. In 1906, after a showdown vote of the board of directors Harahan was voted president of the IC in place of Fish. The ouster of Fish led to a legal battle in the courts, which was won by Harahan and the Harriman interests. The dispute and suppression of Fish lead to hard feelings between the two men and a physical confrontation developed at a board meeting. According to the New York Times, at a board meeting at 11 Broadway Street, on August 20, 1907, Fish, a much younger and larger man attacked and knocked down the older, smaller Harahan. Soon afterwards, Fish severed, or had severed, all connection with the IC.

Harahan served as president until he reached the mandatory retirement age of 70 in January 1911. Harahan had instituted the retire at 70 rule some years before. His last months of service to the IC were tainted with a car repair scandal involving some upper mid level IC employees. They were accused of taking kickbacks for each freight car sent to particular companies for repair. At no time, according to contemporary reports, was Harahan accused of participation in the scheme. The Kinmundy accident that claimed his life, was not the first serious accident Harahan had been involved in as a railroad official. Just three years prior to his death, he had been a passenger in a private car that was struck from the rear at Odin, II. Six months later he had another close call in an accident at Memphis. The accident at Kinmundy is a perfect example of the difficulties of keeping trains separated using rule book operation with only train order stations to check the time. Locomotives of that day had no speed indicating devices. Speed was determined by timing the passage between mileposts. Separation of trains was determined by the operators at the stations.

In this instance, No. 3 was delayed at Effingham {29 miles north of Kinmundy} for several minutes while No. 25 loaded mail and express. The rules then required No. 3 to be held for ten (10) minutes after the departure of No. 25. The train crews of both trains were aware of the presence of each other. No. 25 consisted of a RPO car {railway post office} a bag-gage car, a compartment car, two coaches and Rock Island business car # 1902. No. 25 was pulled by engine 2012 { a 4-6-0 with of a history of it's own {see note at end of article}, built 8/1898 by Rogers Locomotive works with builders number 5292. The 2012 had 19 x by 26 cylinders, 69" drivers and weighed 158,300

Engine #2012

pounds} crewed by engineer Strude, fireman Jessie Gilberd, with flagman Henry J. Broecker, all under the direction of conductor John H. Brainard.

No. 3 was made up of a baggage car, a parlor car, a diner, four sleepers and an observation car. The engine was IC 1079 { a 4-6-2, built by Alco-Brooks in 8/1911 with builders number 50424. Cylinders were 25 x 26, with 75 1/2" drivers, the engine carried 215 pounds of steam and weighed 245, 000 pounds.) The crew of No. 3 consisted of engineer Robert Stuart, fireman C. J. Bert under the direction of Conductor Newell. The speed and power difference between the two engines is apparent today and should have been then.

To further complicate the difficulties faced by the trainmen that night, a "bulletin order" {similar to today's general orders} had been issued requiring all trains to stop for water at Kinmundy. There had been a severe freeze further south, which had affected the water facilities in the area of the freeze. To prevent problems, all trains were supposed to tank up at Kinmundy. In addition, just south of the water tank was the grade level crossing (which is still there today as an UP crossing) with interlocking protection.

To set the scene of the accident, you have a slower train with a wooden business car on the rear. This means that flagman Broecker was not riding at the rear of the last car as usual, instead because of the business car, he was riding in the rear vestibule of the next car, a coach. He had no view directly to the rear. For 19 miles north of Kinmundy the track is straight and practically level. The engineer of the slow train is aware of the orders and stops at Kinmundy. A faster train is following, was separated by ten minutes 30 miles before. The only chance to check the separation was at the order station at Edgwood, about 15 miles before Kinmundy. The engineer of the faster train claims he was not aware of the order to stop at Kinmundy and is running around 50 mph even though there is an interlocking plant with a yellow signal showing just ahead. Further there was another bulletin order requiring a speed of 10 mph through the town of Kinmundy, of which the engineer admitted he was aware.

A northbound freight was stopped at Kinmundy when No. 25 arrived. The crew testified that as soon as the passenger train stopped, they saw the flagman headed to the rear. They then noticed the headlight of No. 3. Flagman Broecker of No. 25 testified that as soon as his train stopped, he jumped off the west side of the next to last car, a coach, and started back. Conductor Brainard, of No. 25 testified that he saw the brakeman jump off on the west side and then he jumped off on the same side and started back. Broecker further testified that as soon as he started back, he saw the headlight of No. 3 only 1 to 3/4 mile to the rear. He ran back as fast as he could swinging his lantern. His signals were answered by engineer Stuart from the engine of No. 3.

Because No. 25 made scheduled time from Effingham, he did not think No. 3 was that close on the markers of his train and he did not use the fusees. He had been provided with ten-minute red and yellow fusees. Further by his watch, they passed Edgewood at 12:12 a.m. and reached Kinmundy at 12:31 a.m. The times reported by the various persons involved in this accident become very important as the investigation develops.

Engineer Stuart of No. 3, testified that he passed Edgewood at 12:18 and collided with No. 25 at 12:32 a.m. Stuart further testified that he saw the rear of No. 25 before he was flagged. He estimated that he was running around 50 mph when he applied his brakes only a few hundred feet before the impact. Stuart further said that he could see only the east marker lamp of No. 25 that he thought was a signal that governed back up movements on the northbound main line. He claimed that when he got close to the business car, he noticed a large amount of steam escaping and thought that this steam had blocked his vision of the other marker. He also testified that had he seen a fusee he could have stopped and he considered that fusees were the "best signal possible" to prevent just what happened. Stuart claimed that he was unaware of the order for all trains to stop at Kinmundy to take water and that his conductor had not said anything about such an order. He acknowledged that he was aware of the speed restriction of 10 mph through Kinmundy. He said he had no intention of stopping at Kinmundy. Conductor Newell, of No. 3, testified that when he handed engineer Stuart his clearance in Effingham, that he told him they had to wait until 11:59 p.m., ten minutes after No. 25, and to take water as usual at Kinmundy.

Operator Schneiderjon, stationed at Edgwood, testified to the ICC that No. 25 passed his office at 12:10 a.m. and No. 3 passed his station at 12:20 a.m. He also admitted that he did not report the passage of No. 25 at the time it passed because the dispatchers were changing shifts. He reported the times for both trains at the same time after No. 3 had passed. The ICC investigators were skeptical about his time keeping, as I am.

For No. 25 to take 21 minutes to travel the 15 miles to Kinmundy from Edgwood and stop would allow a speed of about 45 mph, which is a reasonable speed for a ten wheeler. However, for No. 3 to cover the same distance in 11 minutes is a different story. Here the speed would have to have been over 80 mph. All of the crew members on No. 3 testified that the speed had been around 50 to 60 mph, give or take a little, all the way from Effingham. If that is the case, then there is no way there was a 10-minute separation at Edgewood. It stands to reason that Schneiderjon failed to set his signals to hold No. 3 the required 10 minutes and there-fore was the direct cause of this accident. Engineer Stuart was traveling too fast, was violating orders as to the speed through the town of Kinmundy, and did not have his train under control as he approached the yellow board at the inter-locking at Kinmundy. By ignoring the order to stop and take water at Kinmundy, Stuart's failing to obey orders resulted in the death of four men.

Flagman Broecker of No. 25 also must share some of the fault for this accident in that he did not throw off lit 10-minute fusees along the way, as was the normal procedure. These two trains ran close together every night in this area. In Broecker's defense, it should be pointed out that had he been able to see directly to the rear, he could have seen the headlight of No. 3 and been aware that it was closer than it should have been and then he probably would have taken proper action with the fussees. It must be noted that No. 25 was over 30 minutes late out of Effingham.

In a reconstruction of the accident, one of the ICC's favorite tools, it was determined that the markers of No. 25 were visible for three miles and could be seen as two lights from two miles. It is interesting that the ICC was using at reconstructions at this early date, this was only the forty-first accident investigation. It is of note that the business car was the only car dam-aged. After a couple of hours, the two trains were combined and continued on their way. The business car was of wood-en construction and all the remaining cars were of steel construction.

Major Wright was from a prominent Memphis and southern family. His grandfather was Admiral Raphael Semmes of the Confederate Navy and his father was General Luke E. Wright, a former United States Secretary of War. Wright served in the Spanish American War and in the Philippines. J. T. Harahan was well connected in both the business and social communities of the Deep South. His widow, Mary, was from a prominent Memphis family the Mallorys. Harahan was a member of the important social clubs of the south such as the Pendennis Club of Louisville, the Tennessee of Memphis, the Midday Club of St Louis and the Boston and Pickwick Clubs of New Orleans. His death was a major story in the New Orleans papers where he had lived while working for the L & N and visited many times during his time with the IC.

As to the prior history of IC 2012, the engine on No. 25, when that engine was delivered to the IC in 1898, it carried the number 382. Yes, that is the engine on which John Luther "Casey" Jones "rode to glory" on April 30, 1900. When returned to service three months later, it was renumbered to 212. In 1907 it was renumbered to 2012. It was later, in 1922 renumbered to the 5012 and retired in July 1935.